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Perceptions about the People’s Republic of China’s 
position on Kashmir have long been associated with 
its “all-weather” friendship with Pakistan. however, 
the PRC’s positions on Kashmir have never been 
consistently pro-Pakistan, instead changing from 
disinterest in the 1950s to open support for the Paki-
stani position in the subsequent decades to greater 
neutrality in the 1980s and since. While China has 
continued military support to Pakistan even during 
military conflicts and near-conflicts between India 
and Pakistan, its stance on Kashmir has shifted 
gradually in response to the prevailing domestic, 
regional, and international situations.
Background
Following the partition of the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir in 1947, it was two years before the Com-
munists put the Nationalists to flight and came to 
power in Beijing. The PRC’s interest in Kashmir 
developed gradually following its take-over of Tibet 
in 1950 and its related claims in Aksai Chin in 
Ladakh on the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir 
(J&K) and hunza and the Shaksgam Valley in Paki-
stan Occupied Kashmir (POK).
Following the war with India in 1962, China 
began supporting “self-determination” in Kashmir 
and even provided material support via Pakistan for a 
brief period. Following the 1965 war between India 
and Pakistan, this assistance was ended even though 
political support continued until Deng Xiaoping 
shifted the policy towards one of greater neutrality in 
the late 1970s. Nevertheless, Pakistan continued to 
be important to China’s strategic calculus in South 
Asia. Beijing consistently helped arm Pakistan with 
both conventional and nuclear weapons through 
much of the 1980s and 1990s and this military 
cooperation with Pakistan did not cease during either 
the Kargil crisis of 1999 or the year-long military 
buildup along the Indo-Pak border in 2002 (called 
Operation Parakram in India). Even if the case may 
be made that such support to Pakistan has strength-
ened Pakistan’s hands on the Kashmir dispute, it is 
difficult to draw a direct link between the twists and 
turns in the Kashmir situation and Chinese arms 
supplies to Pakistan. Further, China has for over two 
decades consistently called for a peaceful resolution 
of the Kashmir dispute, terming it a dispute “left over 
from history.” Both during Kargil and Operation 
Parakram, China refused to endorse the Pakistani 
positions or to raise the issue at the United Nations. 
Coupled with rising trade and the continuing border 
dialogue between India and China, this has given rise 
to hopes in India that the Kashmir dispute will no 
longer be a card the Chinese will use against it. 
China and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
The Karakoram highway (KKh) connecting Gilgit 
and Kashgar has served as a vital strategic lifeline 
of Sino-Pakistan relations. While trade continues 
to be limited along the highway, the Chinese have 
pledged considerable amounts in aid to widen and 
repair the KKh and to connect it to Pakistan’s exist-
ing highway network so as to improve connectivity 
with the Pakistani coast. Any altruistic intentions 
aside, maintaining the KKh in working condition 
right through the year is an important part of the 
Chinese strategy to reduce its dependence on oil 
supplies through the Malacca Straits and instead have 
them routed through alternative corridors such as 
via Gwadar. China must also be hoping to plug into 
additional road networks planned between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan and further onwards to Central Asia 
as part of enhancing its strategic reach in South and 
Central Asia and to keep an eye on developments 
there. 
The Chinese have also invested in other infra-
structure projects in different parts of the Northern 
Areas, including hydro-power projects, water-
diversion channels and telecommunication facilities. 
Economic links between the Northern Areas and the 
Chinese province of Xinjiang are limited and depend 
almost entirely on the overland route. however, 
links between Xinjiang and other parts of Pakistan 
are picking up as trade delegations from the former 
visit the Pakistani cities of Islamabad, Rawalpindi, 
and Karachi regularly and Pakistani delegations visit 
Urumqi. The habib Bank of Pakistan has an office 
in Beijing but is also owner of a 20 percent stake in 
the Urumqi City Commercial Bank (UCCB) that it 
acquired in February 2006.
One of the major concerns the Chinese have had 
in recent years in its relations with Pakistan has been 
the fear of Islamic fundamentalism originating in that 
country, which helped radicalize Uighur separatists 
in Xinjiang in the 1990s and which probably has at 
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least partly contributed to China’s changed stance 
on the Kashmir dispute. It has to be remembered 
that Chinese arms that were funneled into Afghani-
stan in the 1980s, via the KKh to be used against 
the Soviets, eventually found their way back into 
Xinjiang via the same route and were used by Uighur 
separatists. It was no surprise, therefore, that when 
the bilateral trade agreement China had signed with 
Pakistan in 1963 lapsed in 2000, the Chinese did not 
renew it for over three years. Border trade has also 
been affected by the increased number of check-posts 
and greater Chinese vigilance at the borders. yet 
another Chinese concern has been the smuggling of 
narcotics through this border.
Nevertheless, for all its concerns, it is likely that 
China will, for the foreseeable future, continue to 
consider Pakistan important for its primary role as 
a counter to India and because the KKh is likely 
to figure increasingly in China’s plans for strategic 
outreach.
China and Jammu & Kashmir
It is the memory of India’s loss to China in the 1962 
conflict, the Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin in 
Ladakh, and claims over Arunachal Pradesh in India’s 
east that are the biggest spurs to India’s anti-China 
lobby. It appears, however, that over time the stra-
tegic importance of Aksai Chin to the Chinese has 
declined vis-à-vis that of Arunachal. At one level, it 
might be argued that things can hardly change given 
that the Sino-Indian border dispute is unlikely to be 
resolved except in its entirety, but at another level, it 
needs to be seen whether simply waiting for the big 
steps towards resolution is enough. In this context, 
Ladakh perhaps provides the ideal location for experi-
menting with ways of carrying forward Sino-Indian 
relations and for exploring new approaches towards 
an eventual resolution of the boundary dispute.
Ladakh, which has historically had close links to 
Tibet and Xinjiang, lost these in 1962, and has over 
the years receded into the background of the Indian 
imagination. Leh, the Ladakhi capital, once served 
as the hub of the Silk Route trade into undivided 
India, but a combination of the British preference for 
Gilgit as the focus of Sino-Indian trade and later, of 
the Sino-Indian war led to Ladakh losing its former 
preeminence and turning heavily dependent on 
Indian central government subsidies and fair-weather 
tourism for economic sustenance.
The way forward for Ladakh hinges primarily 
on two factors: better infrastructure development 
and connectivity, and increased tourist inflow. On 
the first, the Indian government has begun to move 
with greater vigor of late but tourism is also affected 
by the anachronistic Inner Line permits that are 
still required for access to areas closer to the Line of 
Actual Control (LAC) and which continue to close 
off huge chunks of Ladakh to anyone but scarce local 
populations and the Indian Army. While the Indian 
government is beginning to shed its previous inhibi-
tions about building roads along the LAC, this has 
run into strenuous opposition from the Chinese, even 
as the latter have expanded and modernized infra-
structure on their side of the LAC. This has stymied 
Indian efforts but it also needs to be asked if the 
Inner Line permits and exclusive use largely by Indian 
armed forces form part of the reason for Chinese 
protestations. Perhaps if the region were thrown open 
more freely to tourists, the Chinese would be able to 
object far less to Indian road-building efforts. 
Foreign tourists are more important for the 
Ladakhi tourist economy at present than are Indian 
tourists, but this situation is likely to change were 
the Leh-Manasarovar pilgrim route reopened. This 
route connecting Ladakh with Mt. Kailash and 
Lake Manasarovar—holy sites for both hindus and 
Buddhists—passes through disputed territory via the 
last Indian outpost of Demchok. So far the Chinese 
have been reluctant to give the go-ahead to the route, 
perhaps because of the limited economic gains for 
themselves—the Chinese do not want to lose tourism 
to Kailash-Manasarovar on their side that contributes 
to local economies all the way from Lhasa. Mean-
while, smuggling contributes to the local economy 
on both sides of the LAC with thermos flasks and 
blankets entering Ladakh from Tibet and Indian tea 
headed in the other direction.
A case could also be made for the reopening of 
border trade via the Karakoram Pass that provides 
Ladakh’s opening to Xinjiang, even if the route 
presents greater difficulties for road-building than 
the Leh-Manasarovar one. This route, also one of the 
axes of the Silk Route, would pass through the Nubra 
Valley and the last Indian outpost of Daulat Beg Oldi 
onwards to Kashgar and would certainly prove an 
instant attraction for tourists. 
China’s Interests in the Kashmir Dispute 
Its current professed neutrality apart, China retains 
a continuing interest in the resolution of the dispute 
for several reasons. First, the status of the over 2,000 
square miles of territory ceded by Pakistan to China 
under the Sino-Pakistan Frontier Agreement of 1963 
would come up for renegotiation under the terms 
of the Agreement if India and Pakistan resolved 
their dispute over Kashmir and India became the 
sovereign power over the ceded area. Second, in the 
event of a resolution and India regaining control over 
the Northern Areas, this would cut all land connec-
tions between China and Pakistan and put traffic 
through the KKh also under Indian control. This 
would imply losses or at least a degree of wariness 
for China on several strategic fronts, including its 
plans of routing energy supplies from West Asia 
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through Gwadar. Third, even if resolution of the 
Kashmir dispute comes in the form of an acceptance 
of the current status quo, but with soft borders or 
“irrelevant” borders as is now being mooted, India 
will certainly demand greater access to the Northern 
Areas (and indeed, the rest of Pakistan), beginning 
with economic access, which could challenge Chinese 
plans in the region. But fourth, and more positively, 
resolution—even if on the basis of status quo—can 
actually lead to greater possibilities for economic 
interactions between India and China, as outlined 
above, and certainly these could prove more profit-
able from the Chinese point of view than those with 
Pakistan. Further, there could conceivably be added 
impetus for the resolution of the Sino-Indian bound-
ary dispute as well.
It remains to be seen whether resolution or stale-
mate on the basis of status quo will be the case. In the 
meantime, there have been calls for Chinese involve-
ment in the Kashmir dispute from Kashmiris on both 
sides of the divide. Abdul Majeed Mallick, the former 
Chief Justice of the high Court of Azad Kashmir 
and leader of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation 
League, has claimed that the Chinese ambassador to 
Pakistan had promised him that China would return 
Aksai Chin if Kashmir were to become independent. 
Similarly, in 2006 during the World Social Forum 
in Karachi, Indian Kashmiri leader and hurriyat 
Chairman Mirwaiz Umer Farooq called for China 
to be made a party to the resolution of the Kashmir 
dispute, since it not only occupies a part of Kashmir, 
but is also one of the major powers in the region. The 
Pakistani Foreign Office, however, ruled out any role 
for China, saying that only India and Pakistan were 
parties to the dispute according to the relevant UN 
resolutions. During his visit to Pakistan in November 
2006, Chinese President hu Jintao too did not refer 
to any Chinese role in the resolution of the Kashmir 
dispute, saying only that his country supported Paki-
stan and India resolving the issue through dialogue. 
however, in December 2006, Umer Farooq repeated 
his call for China’s involvement and indicated that his 
group was thinking of visiting Beijing in this regard.
Prospects for the Future 
It is important to further explore the points made 
above regarding greater interaction in the economic 
sphere among the three countries and in particular 
between India and China, not just in the interest of a 
resolution of the Kashmir dispute but in the interests 
of better relations among all three countries.
China aims to have stability in its neighbor-
hood and increased market penetration in South 
Asia, and for both reasons stability in Kashmir and 
peace between India and Pakistan are essential. 
China’s Western Development Strategy (WDS) for 
its interior provinces including Tibet and Xinjiang 
make it imperative that there is peace and stability on 
the borders of these provinces as they aim to increase 
their external trade and serve as major hubs for trade 
with China’s western neighbors.
China has hitherto been viewed in the countries 
of South Asia largely either in terms of the strategic 
potential it provided vis-à-vis another country or in 
terms of the threat that it posed. This latter was the 
case, it must be remembered, even with Pakistan in 
the 1950s and led then-Pakistani President Ayub 
Khan to propose to India a joint defense of the 
subcontinent against the communist threat. As rela-
tions with India deteriorated, Pakistan subsequently 
changed its position to viewing China as a hedge and 
an ally against India. It is time that such short-term 
positions give way to more sustainable grounds 
for the Sino-Pakistan partnership. And economics 
provides the way forward, especially for the North-
ern Areas, which remain among the most neglected 
regions under Pakistani governance.
Similarly, in the case of India, some three decades 
after the diplomatic ice with China was first broken 
and more than a decade since the border agreements 
of 1993 and 1996, there really has not been any great 
progress on the resolution of the boundary dispute. It 
is time that the two countries explored and pushed the 
limits of economic cooperation. While border trade 
between the two countries has been slow in picking 
up at Nathu La on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier in India’s 
east, this has as much to do with infrastructural bottle-
necks as with the lack of political will in New Delhi 
to push things faster. In the context of the possible 
linkages through Ladakh outlined above, it might, 
however, be Beijing that is the more reluctant party.
What both India and Pakistan need to realize is 
that China is at that stage of its economic rise where 
it is looking for greater contacts with markets towards 
its south to balance its dependence on the American 
and European markets. Furthermore, linkages with 
Western markets are not sufficient for the develop-
ment of either Tibet or Xinjiang, whose economies 
need sustained and sustainable links with markets in 
India and Pakistan to really take off. The two South 
Asian neighbors thus have the opportunity today to 
move beyond conflict and use the China “card” to 
mutual benefit for a change. In each of the several 
scenarios outlined above, it is Kashmir that lies right 
at the center of the map and it is about time that 
the region is allowed to shed its troubled history and 
take on a new garb as a hub of peace and economic 
development.
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